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Introduction 
 
‘We can model the euphoria and the fear stage of the business cycle. Their 
parameters are quite different. We have never successfully modelled the transition 
from euphoria to fear.’ 
    Alan Greenspan, Financial Times, 27 March 2009 
 
Quantitative models have been a central part of the story of the present financial crisis. It 
was the models used in financial markets which provided the basis for an assessment of 
risk exposure which went so badly wrong (see eg Haldane 2009). But economists’ 
models too failed to capture the systemic risk which resulted from market behaviour (see 
eg Colander et al. 2009). Alan Greenspan’s remark, quoted above, is thus interesting in 
two respects. First, he identifies the problem as a failure to model the turnaround at the 
peak of the cycle. Second he depicts the cycle in psychological terms, such that the 
turnaround is one from greed to fear. The task for economists would appear to be to 
incorporate psychology more successfully in economic models so that financial 
instability can in future be predicted and understood better. 
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The focus of this paper is therefore on how, and in what way, psychology can 
contribute to our understanding of financial instability, as input to modelling by the 
monetary authorities or otherwise. It will be argued that there is a correspondence 
between the view taken of modelling on the one hand and the way in which psychology 
can be incorporated on the other. The argument has been made (Dow 2004) that formal 
modelling (and particularly the search for the single best model) cannot be the full answer 
to understanding the economy, far less prediction. Any one model can only provide 
partial knowledge, to be supplemented by other forms of knowledge, including 
judgement (an argument expressed most recently in relation to the present crisis by 
Lawson, 2009). Indeed Downward and Mearman (2008) have argued that this process 
can usefully be understood as the application of the method of triangulation. In contrast, 
the behavioural finance literature aims to adapt rational choice models using inputs from 
psychology. Was the failure of most economists to anticipate the crisis due, as Alan 
Greenspan suggests, to insufficient development in the capacity to model changes in 
sentiment?  
In exploring the use of psychology in behavioural finance, the focus will be on the 
distinction drawn between cognition and emotion (sometimes expressed as the distinction 
between rationality and irrationality). This distinction itself is then probed in order to 
discuss the limitations of the behavioural economics approach, and then to develop an 
alternative approach which draws more on social psychology and feeds into a 
(Minskyan1) structural explanation of financial instability.2  According to this alternative 
                                                 
1 For surveys of Minsky’s thought, see Dymski and Pollin (1992), Papadimitriou and Wray (1998, 2009), 
Fazzari and Papadimitriou (1992), Dymski and Pollin (1994), Bellofiore and Ferri (2001) and de Antoni 
(2006). 
 3
approach, there is no sharp division between cognition and emotion; indeed cognition 
rests on emotion, and both have an important social dimension. Decisions can be more or 
less reasonable (in relation to reality) but always involve some sentiment or emotion. The 
implications of the two (behavioural finance and Minskyan) approaches are then drawn 
for macroprudential regulation. It is argued that the corresponding role of modelling will 
be critical to how this policy will work. In general, then, policy prescription depends on 
how the economy is understood and therefore framed (see further Dow, forthcoming b). 
But first we explore the different leading explanations for the current instability, in order 
then to consider how each can incorporate psychology. 
 
Different frameworks for explaining the crisis  
There are different ways of explaining the current financial crisis which reflect different 
methodological approaches to economics and indeed different ways of understanding and 
categorising knowledge about financial markets, and which allow for different 
relationships with psychology. The roots of these differences lie in different 
understandings, implicit or explicit, of the nature of the economic system 
The first we will consider is an approach which identifies economics with 
rationality, according to the particular definition of mainstream economics: individual 
choice is based on optimization of utility defined in terms of complete, consistent 
preferences. According to this approach, markets are efficient in maximising social 
welfare as the outcome of the unintended consequences of rational choice. Optimising 
behaviour ensures that market prices embody all available information, with any 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Pech and Milan (2009) focus on the extent and way in which Keynes anticipated many of the key 
empirical findings of behavioural economics. Our focus here is rather on how the mainstream separation of 
emotion from cognition limits behavioural economics theorizing. 
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deviations from equilibrium being arbitraged away. In financial markets, this pricing 
includes the pricing of risk attached to the future value of assets (including the risk of 
default). This optimising behaviour is regarded as a good model of reality for predictive 
purposes (Lucas 1980); and financial markets are generally regarded as where the model 
can most closely be approximated. 
According to the efficient markets hypothesis, markets are normally stable. There 
is motion as new information emerges, but market behaviour ensures stabilisation of 
markets around equilibrium. However sometimes there is instability, in the form of 
rational bubbles. The instability arises from some initial imperfection in the market 
process which becomes amplified. These imperfections might reflect the logistics of the 
market process (such as the length of the working day, differences in time zone, 
regulatory restrictions etc) which prevent perfect arbitrage, particularly where arbitrage is 
the function only of a subset of market players. Then the information conveyed by market 
prices might mislead traders, such that an inadvertent rise in price might be 
misinterpreted as indicating a rising trend, which trading then brings about (rational 
herding), as in the dot.com bubble. This misinterpretation can be regarded as rational if 
the presumption is that market prices normally reflect full information. The bubble bursts 
once full information is restored and assets return to ‘correct’ pricing. Valuations are 
based on subjectively rational expectations. But in an efficient market environment, there 
are forces driving valuations towards the correct levels, which at least can be identified ex 
post. 
In the current crisis, the imperfection on which most emphasis has been placed is 
asymmetric information in the form of opaque structured products whose ‘true’ risk was 
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concealed (although these products found willing buyers). This problem was 
compounded by the misinformation on risk provided by credit rating agencies, which 
were induced by market incentives to understate risk. This New Keynesian explanation 
accounts for a protracted bubble, since the asymmetry of information was endemic and 
took a long time to unwind, though the slow pace of learning is harder to explain.  
These explanations provide no active role for psychology. Indeed this approach 
reflects the conventional distinction between economics as being concerned with 
rationality and psychology with emotion. The emphasis is on cognition as embodied in 
rational optimizing behaviour with respect to an information set. Sentiment is not explicit 
in the account, although arguably it is embodied in preferences. But preferences are 
distilled into income maximization, subject to constraints, qualified by degree of risk-
aversion; they are not a matter for enquiry. The implicit understanding of reality 
(ontology) is that (rational) economic behaviour is separable from other behaviour. 
Further, financial markets, being both thick and innovative, are regarded as the 
archetypical competitive market of mainstream theory. 
But other approaches to analysing financial markets have made more active use of 
psychology, such that both (rational) economic behaviour and psychological factors 
together are seen to determine market processes and therefore outcomes, including 
financial instability and its consequences for the real economy. These approaches draw 
on evidence which appears to raise questions about the efficient markets approach.3 As 
Tuckett (2009) points out, the ontology of financial markets is unusual in that activity is 
based on valuations which are bound up with expectations as to price movements rather 
                                                 
3 However there has been extensive discussion as to the robustness of experimental evidence, and thus of 
experimental design; see for example the symposium in the February 1999 issue of the Economic Journal. 
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than the experience of ‘real’ consumption and production. Psychology (and in particular 
cognitive psychology) therefore potentially has particular purchase.  
Behavioural economics emphasises cognitive limitations which impede fully 
rational choice. (This is one strand of the older behavioural economics spearheaded by 
Simon, 1955.) Thus for example herd behaviour may not be fully rational but rather puts 
undue emphasis on past trends (Bikhchandani and Sharma 2001). Similarly, some 
representative agent models incorporate biased beliefs about market values as a source of 
instability. On the other hand, heterogeneous agent models may capture cognitive 
limitations in that inferences about other agents may not be perfectly updated. Further, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1974, 1979) introduced the idea that agents may not frame 
choice in a rational way, a different form of cognitive limitation. All of these limitations 
on rationality hold the potential for amplified movements away from equilibrium which 
may take a long time to correct. But instability is framed as an aberration, with respect to 
an equilibrium path. 
Psychological factors also enter into behavioural finance in the form of the 
preferences with respect to which agents optimise. Within representative agent models in 
prospect theory, scope is given for unconventional preferences, such as loss aversion, 
which generate apparently irrational behaviour (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Instability can follow when markets experience falling values. Also, heterogeneous agent 
models may allow for different groups of market participants with different preferences. 
In particular, non-professionals may be guided by sentiment, while professional 
arbitrageurs are guided by rationality. Instability may emerge if sentiment drives markets 
in a particular direction, although arbitrageurs will normally ensure a return to 
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equilibrium (Baker & Wurgler 2007). But, as advocated by Robbins (1932), the source of 
preferences is not explored; it is taken as given. 
The third category of explanation for financial instability is based on a quite 
different ontology, in that an understanding of the economic process as an open system 
underpins the view that the potential for crisis is the norm rather than an aberration and is 
just part of a more general, and normal, potential for economic instability in an open 
system. This instability can be understood in a positive light, in terms of Schumpeter’s 
theory of growth by means of successive waves of innovation. Similarly there may be 
waves of innovation in the financial sector. The theory of the business cycle which 
incorporates a mutually-reinforcing real and financial instability is most fully expressed 
in the form of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis (Minsky 1982, 1986). But the 
instability is not pervasive, not is it necessarily explosive – it is more a potential which 
builds up during periods of apparent stability (see Kregel, 2008, Whalen, 2008, and 
Nesvetailova, 2008, for Minskyan analyses of the current crisis).  
At the heart of Minsky’s explanation for financial instability is a distinctive 
epistemology which accords with the distinctive ontology of an open system (Chick and 
Dow 2005). If economic systems (and financial markets within them) evolve, interactions 
within them change, and there is human agency in the form of innovative behaviour, then 
there is no natural tendency towards equilibrium. Thus, for example, there is scope for 
major unanticipated developments, like globalisation which created a new dynamic in 
financial markets which was not reflected in risk measures based on historical data. The 
notion of a true price, or a true risk, therefore becomes tenuous. Instability is not 
inevitable or continuous, since institutions and behavioural conventions develop in order 
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to provide a relatively stable backdrop for decision-making under uncertainty. Even if 
there is little basis in general for quantitative risk measurement (because of fundamental 
uncertainty), nevertheless prices are normally set, and action is taken; decision makers do 
the best they can in the face of uncertainty. And conditions may be such that expectations 
are held with a high degree of confidence, as if knowledge were certain. Thus market 
players may believe that conventional valuations are in some sense ‘true’ valuations.  
But the implication of financial markets being open systems is that pricing 
(including pricing of risk) is subject to the potential for discrete and unpredictable shifts, 
both because of revision of expectations and because of revision of confidence in 
expectations (eg when challenged by an influential figure, or by contradictory evidence 
from real economic developments). As long as valuations are not determined by true risk, 
there is scope for them to change discretely. Minsky’s theory addresses the scope for 
asset valuation, and confidence in this valuation, to evolve at the social level according to 
a general pattern and the associated changes in financial structure whereby the potential 
for crisis can emerge. The process is not deterministic: different cycles are propelled by 
different innovations with different characteristics, and their timing can vary according to 
a variety of factors, such as the point at which conventional judgement is recognised to be 
challenged. Nevertheless Minsky’s theory allows the process to be understood, something 
in general lacking during the recent crisis. 
Rising markets encourage increased leveraging which increases the fragility of the 
financial structure, systemically increasing the potential for instability. As asset prices 
rise in an upturn and confidence in continuing rises becomes more established, 
companies are more willing to borrow to finance investment, households to spend on 
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consumption and financial assets, and banks to lend. The increasing degree of leverage 
seems justified by the associated rise in asset prices, but at the same time the financial 
system became increasingly fragile. In particular, if borrowing costs rise, households, 
companies and banks become increasingly vulnerable to interruptions to cash flow, 
borrowing becomes more difficult and asset sales realise lower-than-expected gains. In 
the meantime, the systemic nature of these market developments confounds normal 
diversification and hedging strategies based on correlations presuming normal 
distributions, reducing confidence in conventional pricing techniques. Thus, given the 
fragility, any shock can lower prices of some assets below expectations and puncture 
expectations about the prices of other assets. Given the fragile structure of finance, cash-
flow problems spread through the system, requiring asset sales, which put further 
downward pressure on asset prices, and increasing default risk. As banks, firms and 
households respond by reducing expenditure and its finance, the economy goes into a 
downturn.  
Minsky gave market sentiment a key role in driving both the upturn and the 
downturn, in a way which seems to be distinct from the individualistic psychology of 
behavioural finance. And the core of Minsky’s theory lies in cognitive issues, but with a 
very different understanding of rationality from mainstream finance and even behavioural 
finance (Dow, forthcoming a). We will explore further here an integration in economics 
of both cognition and emotion. But first we explore in more detail how psychology has 
been used in behavioural economics in order then to clarify the distinctiveness of 
Minsky’s integrative approach 
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Psychology in ‘new’ behavioural economics4 
The way in which psychology has been used in behavioural finance accords with the 
methodological individualism of mainstream economics. Indeed key figures within the 
field have explicitly stated that the aim is to develop theory which is consistent with the 
evidence from experiments but which also fits in with the conventional theoretical 
approach. As Kahneman (2003: 1469) put it, for example, ‘Theories in behavioural 
economics have generally retained the basic architecture of the rational model, adding 
assumptions about cognitive limitations designed to account for specific anomalies’ (see 
further Sent, 2004: 749). Indeed the latest survey of empirical work in psychology and 
(behavioural) economics (DellaVigna 2009) describes the field in terms of ‘deviations 
from the standard model’. Since psychological elements are introduced as amendments to 
the rationality axioms, or as exogenous shocks, the closed-system nature of standard 
theory is retained (shocks being random, their distribution is presumed known). The 
resulting theory must therefore presume a closed-system ontology, such that the 
separation of rationality and irrationality, cognition and emotion, is justified as a 
simplification of reality.  
The psychology which is used is the private psychology of atomistic agents, 
which is represented in the separable functions of setting preferences and then choice 
with respect to those preferences. The preferences themselves are not explored but are 
understood to be standardised sufficiently for representative agent analysis, or at least 
heterogeneous agent analysis with respect to a limited number of categories. While non-
standard preferences may produce explanations for non-standard outcomes, the focus is 
                                                 
4 The older behavioural economics associated with Herbert Simon took a more integrated approach to 
cognition and emotion than the ‘new’ behavioural economics associated with Kahneman and Tversky 
which we explore here (Earl, 1990; Sent, 2004). 
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on choice, where psychological factors may also be active. Choice is analysed in terms of 
rationality with respect to achieving the optimal outcome as defined by the preferences 
(whatever they are). There is scope for some conflict however between a normative and a 
descriptive approach to instrumental rationality. Where experiments reveal non-standard 
behaviour, should the response be to accept this as rational and amend theory 
accordingly, or should it be to classify this behaviour as irrational? This ambiguity in 
mainstream economics is of long standing, going back at least to the nineteenth century 
(Drakopoulos 1991).  
Recourse has been made to neuroscience for insights in theorising about 
apparently irrational behaviour, in terms of both cognitive limitations and the influence of 
emotions (or affect). Neuroscience focuses on the physical functioning of the brain. The 
argument that the functions of reasoning and emotion are physically separate in the brain 
has encouraged the analytical separation between the two. One strand of literature 
focuses on the role of heuristics and intuition in relation to reason. Taking cognitive 
limitations as a starting-point, this literature considers heuristics and intuition as 
mechanisms for dealing efficiently with these limitations; they act as ‘as if’ they were 
equivalent to rational thought (Gigerenzer 2000, 2007).  
Another strand of literature focuses on the role of sentiment (or affect, or 
emotion) in relation to rationality. Some argue that sentiment can limit rationality and 
even override it. But it is also argued that sentiment is necessary for rationality. For 
example, being motivated to maximise pleasure requires the capacity to imagine 
pleasurable emotion. While this might be seen to reinforce the focus of choice theory on 
rationality, at the same time it raises the issue of motivation for action, implying that 
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action, even the action of reactive choice, requires emotion. Neuroscientific evidence 
shows that someone without the physical capacity for emotion is unable to make 
decisions (Gigerenzer and Selton 2001: 207). Thus deductive reasoning is not in general 
enough. It may be sufficient for resolving closed-system problems, as in a game of chess, 
but most choice situations have some open-system characteristics. Indeed neuroscience 
suggests both that emotion is necessary for motivation, and also that the supporting 
reasoning needs to be inductive, thus lacking demonstrable certainty (Klein and 
d’Esposito, 2007).  
In considering the role of cognitive limitations and emotion in unstable financial 
markets, this input from psychology leaves important gaps. How are we to understand 
action, even rationally-grounded action, or reaction, without some theory of emotional 
drivers? How are we to understand action which is not apparently rationally grounded? 
How are we to understand changes in emotional states, as in the changeover from greed 
to fear which Greenspan referred to? Indeed, if we are to understand by ‘greed’ 
something other than self-interest, how are we to incorporate a moral dimension to the 
analysis?  
And finally how are we to understand the role of the individual? As Davis (2003) 
points out, mainstream theory lacks a theory of the individual in relation to tastes. If, as 
he suggests, individuals understand themselves in relation to others (something which 
methodological individualists would dispute), and thus knowledge, sentiment (including 
moral judgement) and action all have fundamentally social content, then the mainstream, 
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atomistic, self-interested individual may not be the most useful basis for analysis.5 
Therefore, just as Minsky analyses financial instability in structural terms, so the role of 
market sentiment may require something other than individualistic psychology. Social 
psychologists have identified the same part of the brain which registers experience of 
emotion (the medial prefrontal cortex) is also the location of the formation of attitudes 
and inferring the contents of others’ minds which are essential features of social 
cognition (Mitchell 2009). Even in physical terms, then, cognition and emotion are 
interrelated. 
In the following sections we explore alternative approaches to incorporating 
psychology into economics, in order to suggest an approach which accords with 
Minskyan theory of financial instability. In the process, an attempt is made to move away 
from the dualism inherent in the mainstream account: rationality/irrationality, 
cognition/emotion, individual/social etc (see further Dow 1990). 
 
An integrated account of cognition and sentiment (and economics and psychology) 
The integrated approach to cognition and emotion we will now explore has ontological 
foundations in an understanding of actual behaviour within an open social system, rather 
than a conceptual privileging of ‘rational’ economic behaviour. Its roots lie in the 
Scottish Enlightenment, when Hume and Smith developed a theory of human nature (see 
eg Dow 2009). Being sceptical about the usefulness of deductive rationalism, they sought 
instead to ground knowledge in human nature, where sentiment was the necessary 
starting-point. Thus the cognition/emotion dual is particular to rationalism. But they 
                                                 
5 Indeed we really need to incorporate more insights from sociology in order to understand social framing 
(see Klaes, 2008, for a compatible discussion of economics and sociology in relation to behavioural 
economics), but our primary focus here is on psychology. 
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argued that, without access to demonstrable truth, we rely on conventional belief in 
relation to experience. As Hume (1739-40: 183, emphasis in original) put it: ‘all our 
reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv’d from nothing but custom; and that 
belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures’. 
New knowledge requires agency on the part of the scientist but becomes the basis for 
conventional belief through rhetorical persuasion, aided by sympathy facilitated by the 
imagination. Individual agency in this case derives from the psychological motivation of 
seeking to relieve what we would now refer to as cognitive dissonance. Thus knowledge 
has a fundamentally social aspect and fundamentally involves sentiment, such that, just 
like the individual/social dual, the cognition/emotion dual is not helpful. 
Hume in particular was a powerful influence on the thought of Keynes (Carabelli, 
1988), who in turn was the primary influence on Minsky (1975). Keynes’s (1921) 
Treatise on Probability was an exercise in establishing grounds for belief under 
conditions of uncertainty. As with Hume, Keynes had an open-system ontology whereby 
he saw the social system as open and organic, precluding certain knowledge (Chick and 
Dow, 2005). Knowledge, and the basis for prediction, are developed inductively using a 
range of methods: different forms of evidence, reason, conventional judgement, heuristics 
and intuition. This process is not an individualistic process, but involves intersubjective 
group expectations (Gillies 2006). The greater the weight of evidence, the greater the 
confidence in the knowledge (which could be knowledge of ignorance). But quantified 
probability is not in general feasible; arguably the General Theory is general in applying 
to the general case of uncertainty rather than the particular case of certainty (Chick and 
Dow, 2001). 
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According to this theory of knowledge, stability and instability have different 
causes from those given in mainstream theory. Since indirect knowledge is non-
demonstrable, it is subject to discrete shifts as conventional judgement changes. Thus for 
example conventional assessments of risk went through dramatic revisions over the last 
two years, with key markets (notably the interbank market) failing precisely because the 
confidence in the ability to price risk collapsed. Thus the pricing process, and the 
uncertainty surrounding it, can be a major source of instability. However, the regulations, 
institutional practices and inflexible prices which are seen in mainstream theory as the 
source of instability, in the Keynesian system promote stability (see eg van der Lecq, 
1998). In an uncertain environment, some provisionally fixed points provide some secure 
knowledge on which to base decision-making. 
This approach to knowledge was echoed in what Sent (2004) refers to as the ‘old’ 
behavioural economics of Herbert Simon. Like Keynes, he focused not only on the 
cognitive limitations, and consequent bounded rationality with which his work is 
normally associated, but also on the open nature of social systems, which precludes the 
possibility of certain knowledge (Simon 1955, 1986). Crucially, unlike mainstream 
theory, he enquired into mental processes, rather than just outcomes. He also developed a 
theory of decision-making based on heuristics rather than conventional rationality. Others 
have applied his work on heuristics to financial behaviour, demonstrating how decision-
rule cascades can explain financial instability (Earl, Peng and Potts 2007). 
Keynes had himself addressed the issue of the apparent rationality/emotion dual 
in an essay based on an encounter between Bertrand Russell, D H Lawrence and himself 
(Keynes 1949). Referring to the rationalism he had earlier shared with Russell, Keynes 
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(ibid.: 448) remarked as follows: ‘The rationality which we attributed to [human nature] 
led to a superficiality, not only of judgment, but also of feeling’. Indeed psychology 
became increasingly evident in his economics, not least with the three psychological 
propensities in the General Theory. As Winslow (1995) argues, Keynes discussed the 
motivation for financial accumulation itself in Freudian terms, although, as Dostaler and 
Maris (2000) argue, Keynes and Freud arrived at similar ideas on money independently.6 
Finally Keynes’s theory of financial markets gave a primary role for market sentiment as 
a contributor to asset valuation. 
But of Keynes’s psychological ideas, it is his concept of animal spirits which has 
resurfaced most noticeably in the current crisis (see in particular Akerlof and Shiller 
2009), not his theory of uncertainty within which animal spirits reside as a part.7 For 
Keynes, animal spirits referred to the urge to action in spite of uncertainty (Dow and Dow 
1991). For Keynes, as for Hume, cognition involves sentiment, but also, consistent with 
modern neuroscience, action requires an emotional driver. It also requires a facilitator, in 
the form of the capacity to imagine the future without access to demonstrable proof (see 
further Shackle 1979). Keynes argued that reason alone could never justify an active 
decision to invest, since the probability of the outcome could not be quantified. After all 
the gathering of evidence and the drawing on different types of reasoning, there is always 
a gap to be filled if action is to be taken. Thus there is a contrast between chapter 11 of 
the General Theory, which posits the investment choice in terms of a rational comparison 
                                                 
6 This focus on the lure of money itself has been revived in modern discussion by behavioural economists 
of the much narrower concept of money illusion, where choices appear to be made regardless of the real 
value of money (see eg Akerlof and Shiller 2009), a phenomenon identified with the medial prefrontal 
cortex, the seat of the emotions.  
7 Pech and Milan (2009) demonstrate how many of the contributions in behavioural economics were 
anticipated by Keynes. 
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of mec and the interest rate, and chapter 12 which argues that the state of long-term 
expectations can never provide the certainty required for rationally-grounded action (see 
Dow 1991). Where confidence in expectations is high enough, it is animal spirits which 
encourage action; but when confidence in expectations is low, there is a withdrawal from 
action.8 Thus, while mainstream theory in Bayesian form posits (subjective) measurement 
of probabilities such that choices may always be made, Keynesian theory suggests that 
there are times of low confidence in expectations when no assessment may be made, and 
there is a withdrawal from choice, reflected in high liquidity preference (Runde 1994).  
In Keynes’s terms, animal spirits play a specific role in a general scheme of 
cognition/emotion, and thus Keynes’s usage differs from Akerlof and Shiller’s (2009) 
usage, which seems to include anything which falls outside conventional (for mainstream 
economics) rationality. For rational choice theory, the distinction between economics and 
psychology mirrored the distinction between rationality and emotion/irrationality. But in 
the absence of perfect knowledge or calculable probabilities as the basis for rational 
choice, ie the impossibility of rationality in the sense understood by rational choice 
theory, these distinctions break down. Economic action in the face of uncertainty requires 
some supportive state of market sentiment and urge to action, while reasons can always 
be produced for behaviour which might be classified as emotional (indeed this is the basis 
for psychoanalysis). Indeed Keynes (1938: 300) makes the centrality of psychology under 
conditions of uncertainty clear in a letter to Harrod, where he explains his critique of 
Tinbergen: economics ‘deals with motives, expectations and psychological uncertainties. 
                                                 
8 Note that confidence is a characteristic of expectations, while the expectations themselves my be 
optimistic or pessimistic; see Dequech (1999) for an elaboration of the distinction and its significance. 
 18
One has to be constantly on guard against treating the material as constant and 
homogeneous’.  
Drawing on more modern literature, we can see that the concept of the individual 
developed here involves reflexivity in that the individual understands herself in relation 
to society, rather than as an isolated atom. So knowledge and behaviour also are reflexive 
with respect to socially-conventional knowledge and behaviour. Learning itself is 
understood as a social process, rather than the stimulus-response process of mainstream 
theory. But this does not mean that all behaviour is socially determined or that the 
individual is only a member of society. As structure-agency theory puts it, given a social 
convention, we can always choose otherwise (Lawson 1997). There are social pressures 
on the one hand (within the society of financial traders, for example) and socially-
conventional knowledge in the absence at times of anything more reliable. But given that, 
individuals can choose to go against the grain. Thus some market leaders are prepared to 
strike out while others hold back, possibly because they have different knowledge or 
because they have strong animal spirits. This account is supported by Dolfsma’s (2009: 
ch. 4) discussion of agency and structure in interrelated terms: change (particularly 
institutional, but in this case behavioural change) arises from the tension between 
individual valuations and social valuations. Indeed one such is someone who has 
contributed himself to the literature on reflexivity: George Soros (2008). He is a market 
leader who reflects on the capacity for reflexivity between cognition and action, such as 
buying an asset in the confident expectation that its price will rise (even though the 
grounds for such an expectation may be weak) will set in train forces which bring about 
the rise in price. 
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There is a recent development in the psychology literature, emotional finance 
theory, which illuminates the role of market leadership and its part in financial instability 
(Tuckett and Taffler 2008). This approach provides elaboration on the psychological 
motivation for behaviour in financial markets. A critical element, which makes it difficult 
to incorporate in more mainstream economic accounts, is that, being psychological, the 
motivation is largely unconscious. Further, as a Freudian psychoanalysis, the account 
emphasises unconscious conflict, in a way which is not amenable to capture in an 
optimising framework. Behaviour is depicted as being driven by conscious reason 
grounded in experience and by unconscious phantasy (wishful fantasies).  
Taking the dotcom bubble as a case study, Tuckett and Taffler argue that bubbles 
follow an emotional sequence as follows: some novelty induces patchy excitement, which 
takes hold in growing excitement which focuses on exceptional expectations and then 
manic/euphoric excitement; but then when the bubble bursts the emotional state becomes 
one of panic and then blame. There is the potential for conflict, between judgement based 
on managing emotion (broadly, trying to feel good and avoid feeling bad) and that based 
on cognition (normal asset valuation), which increases as the excitement builds up. To 
the extent that participants are conscious of this conflict, they experience anxiety and 
refrain from action. But as the phantasy takes hold, they avoid the anxiety by increasingly 
ignoring the reality-based reasoning. This continues even into the downturn, such that, 
when the bubble bursts, participants panic as their expectations are confounded by reality, 
and they then engage in blame rather than the more reasonable emotion of guilt.  
This analysis is supported by Pixley’s (2004) study of Emotions in Finance which 
explicitly explores the role of emotion in financial markets as a necessary adjunct to 
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decision-making under uncertainty. She focuses on the unwillingness to face up to 
grounded reasoning as ever-higher capital gains are expected, the breakdown of trust 
when expectations are disappointed and, like Tuckett and Taffler, the subsequent 
ascribing of blame. Indeed she offers a complex analysis of the role of trust and distrust 
at the institutional (rather than individual) level throughout the process. 
We have here a specific agency-structure framework, in that the market tends to 
be dominated by those willing to act, ie those who resolve the tension between reason and 
phantasy by privileging phantasy. As long as some market leaders allow their phantasy to 
dominate on a rising market, the market rise will be reinforced (given Soros’s reflexivity) 
and others will be encouraged to allow their phantasy also to dominate, and so the boom 
builds up, with the financial structure becoming ever more fragile. Following Pixley, this 
phantasy may operate at a company level as well as the level of individuals. Further, 
while phantasy may be subconscious and involves an emotional response to a wished-for 
outcome, it also involves cognition. It would be possible to use emotional finance theory 
within a mainstream cognitive framework, with reality-based reasoning providing 
‘correct’ risk assessment and phantasy providing an irrationally biased risk assessment. It 
is also open to interpretation from the point of view of bubbles being caused by 
exogenous shocks disturbing an otherwise stable system. But the theory makes more 
sense in an open-system, Keynesian/Minskyan environment where there is no 
demonstrably correct risk assessment, only conventionally-established assessments based 
on reason and evidence (the best that can be done in the circumstances) which are 
vulnerable to shifts. The reality-based reasoning therefore has a weaker hold, and wishful 
thinking becomes a different form of market-conventional assessment.  
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We can therefore summarise this different contribution from psychology to a 
structural theory of financial instability as follows. First, sentiment underpins both 
cognition and action and cannot easily be separated from them, so that no theory is 
complete without it. This is inevitable given the understanding of the open-system nature 
of the subject matter, which precludes ‘true’ risk assessment. Reason and evidence 
(understood in a way conditioned by social convention) can only go so far, and market 
participants must rely also on (socially-conventional) heuristics and ‘market sentiment’. 
Euphoric market sentiment is applied to the pursuit of financial gain builds on the 
dominance of phantasy on the part of some market leaders. As asset prices rise, 
confidence in (over-optimistic) expectations grows, reducing uncertainty and the anxious 
emotional state which that produces. But that anxiety increases after the bursting of the 
bubble: conventional expectations are confounded, increasing uncertainty and distrust 
increases. The turnaround requires enough of a willingness to act in spite of that 
uncertainty – an expression of animal spirits. 
It is worthwhile to return to the beginning of this account, to the theory of human 
nature in the Scottish Enlightenment, where the self-interest of Adam Smith’s (1776) 
Wealth of Nations was tempered by the social awareness of his (1759) Theory of Moral 
Sentiments. Smith’s view that individual identity was tied up with society and with moral 
judgement put the emphasis on that aspect of sentiment. There was great concern with the 
effect of increased commercialisation on moral sentiments, and some might argue that the 
further march onwards of commercialisation in the subsequent two and a half centuries 
has completely eroded moral restraints, with self-interest being expressed as greed. But 
the emotional response of many to the current crisis has been one of moral outrage. 
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Clearly moral sentiments are still an important element in our sense of identity even in 
modern societies. But this is in fact evident even in more normal times. The market 
process requires moral standards in order to function at all. Trust in the behaviour of 
other individuals, and of institutions, is necessary for everyday transactions in a way 
which cannot be accounted for by the mainstream notion of rational self-interest. Even 
remote social contact, as between financial traders whose dealings are all electronic, 
involve conventions (eg over speed of response) which, if flouted, lead to ostracism.  
If we accept the interactions between behaviour, cognition and sentiment in our 
analysis of financial instability, we also need to allow for some of those sentiments to be 
moral sentiments. But if we continue with the mainstream frame, which distinguishes in a 
dualistic manner between rationality and irrationality, cognition and preferences, and so 
on, then it is not clear how to incorporate such notions as fairness or greed into a 
reductionist model of individual behaviour. Akerlof and Schiller (2009) include the 
notion of fairness in their discussion of animal spirits, as a preference which departs from 
standard rational self-interest. But the fact that they group together such a diverse 
collection of factors which don’t accord with rational economic man in their discussion 
of animal spirits implies that the concept is being taken to incorporate all ‘irrational’ 
behaviour.  
 
Policy implications 
We have explored a different, structural, explanation for financial instability and the way 
in which psychology can be incorporated in a non-dualistic manner. Which approach we 
choose is determined by our ontology – how we understand the real world. So others 
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prefer the conventional approach which sees the crisis as an aberration. Which approach 
we choose has policy implications, and we explore these here. We will focus particularly 
on the proposal to regulate for systemic risk: macroprudential regulation. Here we will 
see that it is fundamental whether emotion is something separable from cognition or not.  
Macroprudential regulation, to address systemic risk, is an idea with widespread 
support. It follows naturally from Minsky’s analysis that attention needs to be paid to 
systemic risk and the factors which feed it. The key development has been a more 
widespread recognition of the importance of systemic risk. From a more mainstream 
perspective, Brunnermeier et al (2009), for example, have supported the idea, on the 
grounds that individual actors in the financial system cannot price in risks which arise 
elsewhere as the unintended consequences of their actions. Such risks, which are 
endogenous to the system, have the potential (in mainstream parlance) to drive the system 
from equilibrium. A bank, for example, protects its assets, if asset prices are falling, by 
calling in potentially bad loans, or selling bonds, which causes asset prices to fall and 
thus defaults elsewhere in the system. While rational at the micro level, such actions 
create a crisis at the macro level as asset prices fall, defaults rise, spending falls, 
borrowing becomes more difficult, and so on. In particular, the failure of one financial 
institution which might seem justified at the micro level (on moral hazard grounds) can 
spread panic through the rest of the financial system. This contagion of course is what the 
Minsky approach has always analysed as the outcome of the normal process of financial 
instability, and for which regulation has been advocated as a way to moderate the 
process.  
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The mainstream approach, which has stable markets as a benchmark, presumes 
that complete prices (including pricing of risk) are feasible, allowing rational choice. 
Psychology, as we have seen, only enters into preferences and cognitive limitations, and 
there only in a limited way. There is a normative approach to instrumental rationality, 
which means that there is a tendency to design policy in such a way as to facilitate 
rational choice and to discourage emotional/irrational behaviour. Thus Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008) for example have proposed a policy of ‘nudging’ individual behaviour 
towards the rational self-interest which would allow markets to produce the socially-
optimum outcome. Macroprudential regulation would nudge banks towards more rational 
behaviour from the perspective of the system as a whole, by varying capital ratios pro-
cyclically, and changing mark-to-market practices, for example. But there is a danger that 
this approach is seen as requiring calculation of systemic risk, and prediction of market 
valuations, by the authorities in order to introduce the regulator as an additional rational 
agent which would then attempt to alter market relations through regulation in such a way 
as to price in systemic risk. The difficulties of achieving this through regulation are well-
known; what we focus on here is the knowledge base on which this policy is to be built. 
The most likely implication for the development of the theoretical literature would be to 
aim to incorporate these complex interactions which lead to systemic risk (the unintended 
consequences of rational behaviour) into the existing formal models.  
But Minsky himself argued against the suggestion that he capture his theory 
within a single large model (rather than the illuminating collection of partial models he 
offered), on the grounds that structural cycles follow a general path which is predictable 
but that their timing is not determinate (Foley 2001). This follows from the absence of 
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true asset prices by which to judge actual prices, the role of conventional judgement, and 
the scope for that judgement to shift. Market sentiment plays a fundamental role in the 
valuation of assets, and can cause price increases, which are the unintended consequences 
of others’ asset purchases, to be exaggerated and a euphoric boom to build up. Similarly 
falls in valuations which are the unintended consequences of others’ sales can fuel panic 
selling. This behaviour is not purely rational in the mainstream sense, nor purely 
emotional, but the way in which individuals in a social market setting act under 
uncertainty. But because market sentiment is not determinate, neither the forces which 
ultimately cause it to change, nor the timing and severity can be predicted. According to 
this approach, therefore, focusing attention on (albeit more sophisticated) mathematical 
models to the degree that policy-makers relied on models before the crisis, could distract 
attention from other sources of knowledge and create a false sense of security. Effective 
macroprudential regulation designed to reduce systemic risk would need to be supported, 
not only by partial models of different aspects of the system, but also by attention to the 
indicators of fragility within a particular institutional environment.9 It would also require 
attention to new developments (in products and practices) which might create financial 
stress in the future. Above all macroprudential regulation would therefore require 
vigilance.  
As Minsky (and Keynes) argued, models are good ways of depicting and 
analysing mechanisms within parts of the economic system segmented off for analytical 
focus (Chick and Dow, 2001). Thus agent-based models which simulate the 
consequences of particular representations of behaviour, network analysis which focuses 
on interconnectedness, and stress-testing to estimate the impact of a range of eventualities 
                                                 
9 The Bank of Canada has been developing a Financial Stress Index; see Illing and Yu (2003). 
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(see eg Haldane 2009) are potentially all valuable sources of guidance. But they are all 
partial, and not sufficient for prediction, other than of multiple tendencies. It is the 
creative innovations designed to evade regulation, and completely unforeseen 
developments such as the freezing-up of the interbank market in 2007, and the point at 
which market sentiment shifts, which defy prediction. A focus on rational behaviour 
within an efficient-markets framework instead focuses attention on (predictive) 
modelling of behaviour within the current financial structure as a basis for policy. But we 
have seen that this framework is grounded in a conceptual separation of cognition from 
emotion which makes it difficult for behavioural economics to incorporate the richness of 
their insights about financial behaviour. A focus instead on the interaction between 
reason and sentiment within particular institutional arrangements in an uncertain 
environment seeks guidance from models but puts the emphasis much more on the 
limitations to modelling. Within such an approach, the primary focus of macroprudential 
regulation should be vigilance to change outside the models.  
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